Publisher’s Note: Many worthies, ordinarily self-professed “special operators,” (I never knew so many could exist) have been making much of the American if not Western expertise in building, fighting and dashing enemies with unconventional warfare (UW).
This is a myth.
Per UW, modern post-WWII US special operations forces never do long dwell-time partisan/guerrilla creation and improvement. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) does not a guerrilla make. They didn’t even do it in Vietnam (six month rotations in and out). The 39th Special Forces Detachment, 1st Special Forces Regiment was apparently tasked with this mission in Berlin for partisan activation but demobilized in 1984. The mission never materialized.
Of course, some secret squirrel government apparatchik can huff and puff it’s been done but it’s a state secret, don’t you know. Yeah, right.
I find it most interesting that counterinsurgency dominates all the statist literature on how to prosecute these conflicts. Think of this much like the foolishness of counter improvised explosive device (IED) task forces and think tank bloviations on how to technically defeat mine warfare which has been in existence for millennia. Why haven’t the mandarins bothered to nominate massive brain trusts and expenditures of tens of billions on counter-rifle warfare or such arcana?
As a matter of fact, when things get really sporty in the coming Endarkenment descending on the USSA and the Slave Forces (SLAVFOR) start fighting against the inevitable insurgency that is germinating in the states, watch how well that works out. I assure you it will be much like the bloody Kansas and Missouri conflicts in the South before the War of Northern Aggression where Federal involvement built and motored a southon resistance from scratch with scorched earth tactics.
You should read the interview I appended with the fascinating German General Hermann Balck, which I refer to below in the essay. He proposed that a way to make mines work even better is to emplace dummy mines at a ratio in excess of 50:1 to drain enemy time and resources. Food for thought for the coming festivities.
In order to contest an insurgency, one must understand why they occur and what machinations make them remain afloat and expanding despite the massive influx of First World military technology, manpower and vast treasure. Well, the answer is rather simple: invasion foments insurgency and the more of the former the more robust the latter in response.
The West for all its trillions spent, tens of thousands injured and time and resources utterly wasted can’t seem to grok that rather simple fact.
Want to win a counterinsurgency? Pack up and leave. No Muslim insurgency since the end of the War to Save Josef Stalin has been defeated.
Enough of that, I owe the readership a list on 4GW but today we’ll tackle a top five list of readings in the conventional spectrum and I will not endorse Clausewitz despite his titanic presence in these strategic circles that discuss warfare.
Here’s the bottom line: the US has not won a conventional conflict much less an unconventional conflict despite the trillions spent and the wholesale creation of one of the largest and most technologically advanced armed forces in the history of mankind since the end of the War to Save Josef Stalin.-BB
I have tackled reading lists for military matters before that I crafted. So I wanted to update the list with a more focused addendum that discusses how and why mass conventional armies operating on the full spectrum of conflict behave in success and defeat.
There are plenty of serviceable unconventional/4GW/guerrilla lists out there but I think my readership deserves one I would recommend. That will be forthcoming after completing this one.
But first, I’ve crafted this top five list on a more conventional military perspective of military reading for Second and Third Generation baseline military theory and practice because if you don’t know that, you can’t fight 4GW; how can you guerrilla if you don’t know what are centers of gravity, command echelonments and logistical needs for SLAVFOR in both meat-space and decision cycles? There are many other concerns in addition to these.
I’ve spent a little time in combat zones and can claim no great laurels whatsoever but I have had my eyes open and opened.
Much of IRB/IRA leader Michael Collins’ success is that he had a fair amount of former veterans of the British Army in his flying columns. Not special operators (isn’t every vet nowadays?) but regular mud-boggers who had seen the grinding death-machine of the British Army in France during WWI. Collins was a titan in guerrilla warfare in the 20th century but many of his methodologies were born of observing first hand how conventional units behave.
It’s been December of 2001 in Afghanistan for nearly 14 years, ground-hog day from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the lowest Afghanistan National Army private. The day the last Western boot leaves Afghan soil, Kabul will come under siege and fall in a month. Again, trillions wasted to make the military industrial complex flush with money and the region awash in corpses and mayhem after the Western incursion.